Four German military officials discussed what targets German-made Taurus missiles could potentially hit if Chancellor Olaf Scholz ever allowed them to be sent to Kyiv, and the call had been intercepted by Russian intelligence.

According to German authorities, the “data leak” was down to just one participant dialling in on an insecure line, either via his mobile or the hotel wi-fi.

The exact mode of dial-in is “still being clarified”, Germany has said.

“I think that’s a good lesson for everybody: never use hotel internet if you want to do a secure call,” Germany’s ambassador to the UK, Miguel Berger, told the BBC this week. Some may feel the advice came a little too late.

Eyebrows were raised when it emerged the call happened on the widely-used WebEx platform - but Berlin has insisted the officials used an especially secure, certified version.

Professor Alan Woodward from the Surrey Centre for Cyber Security says that WebEx does provide end-to-end encryption “if you use the app itself”.

But using a landline or open hotel wi-fi could mean security was no longer guaranteed - and Russian spies, it’s now supposed, were ready to pounce.

  • fluxion@lemmy.world
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    4 months ago

    A researcher in cryptography in Berlin, Henning Seidler, believes the most likely theory is that the officer dialled in via his mobile phone and the call was picked up by spies’ antenna who can also “forward” the traffic onto the main, official antenna.

    Seems like the more likely theory

      • WhatAmLemmy@lemmy.world
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        4 months ago

        “Intelligence” services cost taxpayers billions a year, so the billion dollar question is why is it possible to dial in to “official” military communications over insecure channels at all?

        Why doesn’t the government run their own signal or matrix infra? Why are they paying Cisco, and introducing the numerous attack vectors of a proprietary optionally-encrypted service?

        The threat of surveillance capitalism isn’t just in the dragnet surveillance of the population. It’s in the profiteering of “partnerships” between private and public — the drive of corrupt and incompetent political and military leadership to direct funds to sub-optimal proprietary services and protocols, instead of leveraging public funding to contribute to open-source and make hardened systems ubiquitous.

          • WhatAmLemmy@lemmy.world
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            4 months ago

            That’s what I’m getting at. This ultimately isn’t the fault of some technobozo who dialled in from hotel wifi. If the system were fit for purpose, technobozo could dial in over any network.

            The is the fault of German politicians, military, and “intelligence”. This type of compromise should not exist as a matter of circumstance. It should only be possible when an end users device is directly compromised.

          • lad@programming.dev
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            4 months ago

            Probably the client runs poorly on the cutting edge Nokia 3310s those generals use

      • SkippingRelax@lemmy.world
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        4 months ago

        We are talking about the person/department that has ensured that they run an especially secure, certified, version of webex losing their job right?

        As much as I’d like to think that senior military people have some basic awareness about security, this is really a tool that was considered secure by the organisation. Sounds like a big gaping whole letting dialin enabled for anyone to use.

          • SkippingRelax@lemmy.world
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            4 months ago

            Vut it shouldnt even happen. They were in Singapore at the time that, they had to join in remotely. There is a whole department responsible for running the infrastructure and make sure its secure, this is, hardly the end users fault.

            • Maggoty@lemmy.world
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              4 months ago

              Shit they probably could have just asked the US to use the local SCIF. It’s not like we don’t already know the information.