If my understanding of longtermism is correct, it’s more of a function of utilitarianism. If one wants to do the most good for the most people, then it makes some amount of sense to focus on the far future where presumably there will be more people.
Their consent is irrelevant, which is kind of the opposite of what I’m saying, which is that consent is relevant.
I fail to see how the mere concept makes sense right now. That’s the same flawed logic as longtermists use.
If my understanding of longtermism is correct, it’s more of a function of utilitarianism. If one wants to do the most good for the most people, then it makes some amount of sense to focus on the far future where presumably there will be more people. Their consent is irrelevant, which is kind of the opposite of what I’m saying, which is that consent is relevant.
It’s the other side of the same coin. They both argue about the well-being/bad-being of hypothetical humans. It’s bogus, either way.
They are not related because you have to exist to experience well-being or “bad-being”. What I’m talking about is consenting to exist.